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A B S T R A C T
This study estimates the long-run effect of the school tracking age on educational attainment and labour market
outcomes. We exploit within-country variation in tracking ages for students in the highest two tracks in the
Netherlands, using the supply of early tracking schools at the municipal level as an instrument for early tracking
(tracking at age 12–13 vs. age 14). Combining several data sources, we find that early tracking leads to a
decrease in higher education completion, and that it lowers earnings for both low-ability and medium-ability
students in the sample. Estimates for high-ability students are positive but imprecisely estimated. The negative
effects appear largely driven by higher misallocation of students to tracks when they are sorted early. Robustness
analyses strongly suggest that the results are not driven by sorting between municipalities.
1. Introduction
There is an ongoing debate on the merits of tracked versus com-
prehensive education. Tracking can enhance teaching efficiency be-
cause instruction is targeted towards a homogeneous group of students,
but can also enhance inequality by sorting peer and school quality.
Additionally, assessments that determine track assignment cannot
perfectly forecast student potential, thereby allocating some students to
a track that is suboptimal for their learning process. Among countries
that track students, there is substantial variation in the age at which
tracking takes place. The implications of even small differences in the
tracking age can be large in the long run. For one, skill formation is a
dynamic process in which early learning begets future learning, and
therefore early differences in skill development can expand over time
(Cunha & Heckman, 2007). Additionally, different tracking ages also
imply differences in the accuracy of sending students to their optimal
track, which can influence educational pathways throughout secondary
school as well as student choices towards post-secondary education and
subsequent job opportunities.
This paper estimates the effect of early tracking on educational at-
tainment and labour market outcomes, for students in the intermediate
and academic track of Dutch education. We exploit within-country
variation, as tracking in the Netherlands can take place in grade 7, 8 or
9, depending on school policy. We define early tracking as taking place
in grade 8 (when students are typically 13 years old) or before. We
estimate an instrumental variable model that uses the relative supply of
early tracking schools in the municipality as an instrument for early
tracking. This study uses a rich dataset that matches students from a
secondary school cohort study with administrative data on educational
careers and labour market outcomes, and to data on the school tracking
policy for every school in the Netherlands to deduce the supply of early
tracking schools that each student faces.
We find that early tracking initially leads to a higher likelihood of
being sorted into the academic track, but ultimately to lower levels of
educational attainment and lower earnings. Both low-ability and
medium-ability students experience negative earnings effects from
early tracking, but with a different dynamic across outcomes. Those
(initially) perceived as low-ability students appear negatively affected
because earlier tracking leads to a less accurate assessment of their
abilities. Medium-ability students appear negatively affected through a
too strong tendency to put them in the more demanding academic track
when tracking is earlier, which puts them on a downward trajectory
during the remainder of their educational career and early labour
market years. The point estimates of the effect of early tracking for
students of high ability are positive and substantial, but imprecisely
estimated. The negative earnings effects for the sample as a whole,
which are around 14%, are largely attributed to a decrease in hours
worked. This, in turn, is partly mediated by field of study.
Students in the Netherlands enter secondary school in grade 7, when
they are typically 12 years old, but track assignment can still be post-
poned for one or two grades. The exact tracking age in lower secondary
education is up to the discretion of school leadership. Literature
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suggests that this school policy is predominantly driven by the peda-
gogical and didactic views of school directors (Korpershoek, Naaijer, &
Bosker, 2016). While our estimation approach corrects for sorting
within municipalities, the estimates can still be biased through sorting
of students between municipalities. Our results provide evidence
against this. First, while early tracking correlates strongly with a wide
range of individual background variables and baseline test scores, the
instrument is orthogonal to all observable characteristics, suggesting
that sorting is concentrated within municipalities. Second, the estimates
remain highly similar when including geographical controls such as
level of urbanization, and we also observe the same pattern of results
within low urbanised areas as within high urbanised areas. Hence, the
results are not driven by unobserved differences between students/
parents living in cities and students/parents living in rural areas. Third,
we find no evidence of a relationship between the instrument and
parental attitudes and investments, derived from the survey data.
Fourth, we find that the different didactic views that are behind the
different tracking decisions are not reflected in (other) aspects of school
quality.
The literature on tracking is rich and expanding. Several studies
exploit between-country variation through difference-in-difference de-
signs to estimate the relation between tracking and student achieve-
ment; see, e.g., Hanushek and Zhang (2006). A rare instance of ex-
perimental variation is exploited by Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2011),
who identify positive effects on achievement in Kenya. Most recent
studies exploit tracking policy changes in European countries.
Guyon, Maurin, and McNally (2012) find that an expansion of the elite
track in Northern Ireland led to increases in educational attainment,
while Piopiunik (2014) identifies a negative effect on the educational
achievement of low-ability students from a shift of tracking from grade
6 to grade 4 in Germany. Pekkala Kerr, Pekkarinen, and Uusitalo (2013)
similarly find that a postponement of the tracking age in Finland im-
proved test scores of low SES students.
In general, these studies conclude that (earlier) tracking does not
benefit mean performance and harms low-ability students.1 However,
these findings are limited to educational achievement and attainment.
One of the motivations for tracking (earlier) is that not all students are
deemed fit to pursue a track with an academic focus. It might therefore
not be surprising that earlier sorting leads to lower performance on
academic achievement tests and fewer academic degrees for low-ability
students. It would arguably be more valuable to evaluate such practices
by looking at how students fare in the labour market. Studies on the
labour market effects of early tracking are more scarce but notable
exceptions exist. Their findings are mixed and underline the importance
of estimating long-run effects. Hall (2012) finds that a policy change
that made the vocational track in Sweden more academic increased
educational attainment in secondary school, but did not lead to higher
university enrolment or higher earnings in later life. Malamud and Pop-
Eleches (2010, 2011) identify a similar dynamic across outcomes for a
postponement of the start of vocational education in Romania. On the
other hand, Meghir and Palme (2005) (for a joint reform that increased
both the tracking age and the compulsory schooling age in Sweden) and
Pekkarinen, Uusitalo, and Kerr (2009) (for Finland) identify positive
wage effects for low-ability students from attending (more) compre-
hensive schooling.
All of these long-run studies exploit tracking policy changes. This
provides a robust way around the selection issues that plague estima-
tion relying on cross-country or (static) within-country variation. On
the other hand, identification through policy changes could pick up on
transitional effects or unobserved changes in related policies. For ex-
ample, teachers have to adjust to teaching either more or less homo-
geneous groups and new curricula have to take shape over time. This
study, in contrast, provides evidence for an educational system in which
tracking policies have been stable for a long time, relying on within-
country differences at the same point in time. Additionally, previous
studies have examined situations in which at least part of the student
population shifts from an academic to a vocational curriculum or vice
versa. In contrast, we study a setting with two non-vocational tracks for
which the formal curricula are similar (i.e. students follow the same set
of school subjects). Hence, our study is not about the effects of (more)
academic versus vocational education. The setting allows us to zoom in
on the “efficiency arguments” of early tracking, in terms of having a
more homogeneous set of peers versus having a lower accuracy of
sending students to their optimal track.2 Van Elk, Van der Steeg, and
Webbink (2011) provide evidence in the same Dutch setting, also ex-
ploiting geographical variation, to estimate the effect of early tracking
for a subgroup of low-ability students. They find that it leads to fewer
higher education diplomas for this subgroup. Our study differs by also
estimating labour market effects, focusing on the full ability distribu-
tion within the top two tracks, and relying on a different instrument to
correct for the endogeneity of tracking age.
To sum up, this study provides three main contributions to the
tracking literature. First, we contribute to the expanding but still scarce
literature on the long-run effects of tracking age. Second, by focusing on
a settled tracking system and on students in two non-vocational tracks,
our setting allows us to identify effects that are not driven by adjust-
ments to new policies or by differences in the formal curriculum, but
rather capture the allocative aspects of earlier versus later tracking. We
also develop a theoretical model that specifies these different me-
chanisms and how they interact with ability. Third, by combining ad-
ministrative and survey data, we can uncover more of the mechanisms
and heterogeneity that are behind tracking age effects. Previous studies
typically rely on registered data on final educational attainment. Our
longitudinal data register the position in the educational system for
every year of the educational career as well as post-secondary study
choices, which allows us to estimate the complete dynamics of the early
tracking effect. These dynamics turn out to be highly important in ex-
plaining the long-run effects. The availability of pre-treatment
achievement data also allows for a rich heterogeneity analysis across
student ability.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical
framework. Section 3 gives an overview of the Dutch educational
system. Section 4 discusses data. The methodological approach is ex-
plained in Section 5. Section 6 presents the main results, after which
robustness analyses are discussed in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2. Theory
The effect of the age of tracking on future outcomes can operate
through multiple mechanisms. Brunello, Giannini, and Ariga (2007)
develop a theoretical model that pits peer sorting (which favours earlier
selection) against uncertainty about the student’s type (which favours
later selection). In this section, we expand on this model, by also in-
corporating instruction effects and heterogeneity by ability.
2.1. Instruction effect
In the empirical setting of this paper, two tracks are considered and
1 Conversely, Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2005) find that the shift in the
United Kingdom from a tracked to a comprehensive system had no benefits for
low-ability students and harmed high-ability students, but Manning and
Pischke (2006) show that the approach of the study does not solve the en-
dogeneity issue.
2 The setting therefore also relates to the US-based literature on ability-
grouping; see, e.g., Betts and Shkolnik (2000); Rees, Brewer, and Argys (2000).
There are two crucial distinctions: students are separated from the other track
for all school subjects, and the tracks provide different eligibility towards post-
secondary education.
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sorting is based on average student ability. The theoretical model is also
built from this perspective. Students can be tracked, or held together in
a comprehensive class. This results in three possible investment paths,
pertaining to either the low track L, the high track H, or the compre-
hensive track C. The return on these investment paths depends on the
ability type θi, and is reflected in a future outcome variable Yi. For each
track T, we have:
= +Yi T T i (1)
We specify that, also in absence of peer effects, αT and βT will differ
between tracks because instruction will be adjusted to the ability dis-
tribution in class. We label this as the ‘instruction effect’ of tracking. In
general, this can comprise both differences in formal curricula and
‘informal’ differences that reflect that teachers adjust pace and level of
instruction to the ability level of the class for a given subject. In the
empirical setting of this study, students follow the same school subjects
in each track, and only the latter difference applies. The same principles
apply.3
We assume that instruction is adjusted to the level of the median
student in each track. As a result, lower (higher) tracks provide better
outcomes for students of lower (higher) ability. This implies that
αL > αC > αH and βL < βC < βH. This situation is depicted in Fig. 1. If
the allocation of students to tracks maximizes individual payoffs, out-
comes under tracking will equal:
= + +Y max ( , )i L L i H H i (2)
Alternatively, the payoff under a comprehensive system will equal:
= +Yi C C i (3)
In Fig. 1, the tracked system is favourable for students to the left of
type θa and to the right of type θb, while the comprehensive system is
favourable for those in between. It could also be argued that hetero-
geneity in class is detrimental to the efficiency of instruction in general,
such that comprehensive classes also harm students of medium-ability.
Values for αT and βT can be chosen accordingly. Still, one may assume
that C is relatively more favourable for medium-ability types compared
to low and high-ability types, leading to a similar pattern across θi.
Additionally, αT and βT can be different for different outcome variables.
This underlines the importance of estimating both the short-run and the
long-run impacts of different tracking policies.
2.2. Noise effect
The model so far assumes that there is perfect information and each
student is allocated to the track that maximizes Yi. In reality, ability is
measured with error and students can be allocated to a suboptimal
track. This is labelled by Brunello et al. (2007) as the “noise effect of
tracking”. The later tracking takes place, the larger the information set
and the lower the risk of misallocation. This noise effect is a key aspect
of tracking, since misallocation influences the learning environment
throughout secondary schooling, and can significantly impact trajec-
tories after secondary education as well. We label the noise penalty of
earlier tracking as γi. How this effect differs across ability depends on
two opposite forces. The risk of misallocation is highest at the ability
threshold θc, but the size of the penalty increases when we move away
from θc. The relation between γi and θi thus depends on the assumed
functional forms. The negative effect of misallocation is assumed to be
linearly related to i c (by H L). Additionally, we (reasonably)
assume that the measurement error on the ability signal is normally
distributed around the true ability. The resulting simulation is pre-
sented on the right side of Fig. 1. The parameter γ equals zero at θc,
where there is no loss from misallocation, and at the extremes, where
there is no probability of misallocation, while it is positive in between.
To avoid being too restrictive, we simply specify that γi depends on
the distance from the cut-off point, without assuming any functional
form:
= f ( )i i c (4)
It is likely that γi also depends on the type of misallocation. Being
assigned to a track that is above ones capabilities involves different
mechanisms and likely leads to a different impact than being assigned
to a track that is below ones capabilities (also depending on the pos-
sibilities for retracking in each direction). As such, the payoffs from
early tracking are equal to:




The payoff from later tracking is the same as under Eq. (3). Later
tracking is also based on a noisy ability signal, but the noise is lower
than under early tracking. As such, i
T reflects the increase in the noise
parameter from tracking earlier. The noise effect shifts the cut-off types
θa and θb further to the left and right, respectively, thereby increasing
the total set of students that favours later tracking.4
2.3. Peer effects
In Fig. 1, the effect of early versus late tracking is symmetric around
θc, leading to a similar optimal size of tracks L and H. However,
tracking also reallocates peers. Peer quality decreases in Track L and
increases in Track H, relative to Track C.5 Additionally, dispersion in
peer quality reduces through tracking. The literature identifies sub-
stantial positive effects of peer quality on school achievement, and
mixed evidence for the effect of peer dispersion (Epple & Romano,
2011; Sacerdote, 2011). Following these findings, panel (a) of Appendix
Figure A1 incorporates peer effects by decreasing αL and increasing αH
relative to αM. Fig. 2 directly shows the resulting effect of early versus
late tracking across the ability distribution. Peer effects decrease the
optimal size of track L and increase the optimal size of track H. Hence,
(stronger) peer effects shift the cut-off types θa, θb and θc to the left.
2.4. Heterogeneity and thresholds
The empirical analysis of this study estimates the effects of early
tracking separately for students of low, medium and high ability. While
the model states that students between θa and θb are hurt by earlier
tracking, we cannot predict how this translates to these ability types, as
the location of θa, θb and θc depends on the true values of αT, βT and γT.
Strong peer effects will lead to a high αH and will shift the cut-off types
to the left. The student at the median of the ability distribution can then
still prefer early tracking. Although we cannot unambiguously say that
those with high θi benefit from early tracking, it is highly likely that
3 One may consider ‘curriculum effect’ (comprising both formal and informal
aspects of the curriculum) to be a more appropriate term for this mechanism.
However, since it is a particular feature of this study that the empirical setting
involves no differences in the formal curriculum, we consider this terminology
to be confusing here.
4 While there is no noise effect for students at θc, the negative effect of early
tracking is still maximized at this point. This is a result of the chosen para-
meters; βC is exactly in between βL and βH. Since the probability of assignment
to the right track is at least 50%, the noise effect when moving away from θc
does not compensate for the stronger instruction effect at θc. Panel (d) of
Appendix Figures A1 and A2 shows that the effect of early tracking is mini-
mized at a different point for alternative values for αT and βT (panels (b) and (c)
show that this can also occur when the threshold is not at the efficient point).
Even for the rather extreme parameters chosen here, the minimum point is not
far from θc.
5 Teacher and school quality can differ as well between tracks. For simplicity
of presentation, we model these under the same umbrella, assuming they all
gradually improve across the distribution and have a linear positive effect. The
model can easily be expanded to incorporate non-linear effects.
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they do. Only a very high noise penalty can compensate for the fa-
vourable instruction and peer effect, which is unlikely given the low
probability of misallocation at this distance from θc. It is comparatively
more likely that low-ability students are hurt by early tracking, as the
peer effect works in the opposite direction.
While recognizing that the ability signal is noisy, we have still as-
sumed that the targeted ability margin for going to the higher track is θc,
as is efficient (i.e. θc is at the student that is indifferent between tracks L
and H). The effective ability margin may either be more lenient or more
strict than that efficient margin. For example, schools that offer track H
may lower the ability threshold to attract more students, or may set a
higher ability threshold to increase average student ability.
Additionally, overconfidence by students and parents may expand track
H. Panels (b) and (c) of Appendix Figures A1 and A2 show the effects of
early tracking when thresholds are set either too low or too high. Too
lenient assignment will shift θa and θb to the left, while too strict as-
signment will shift these cut-off types to the right. The effective location
of the threshold may also differ between early and late tracking. Under
higher uncertainty (i.e. earlier tracking), schools may be risk-averse
towards letting marginal students enter track H, as failure at the higher
track presents costs for the school (e.g. through grade retention).
Overconfidence of parents and students might make them more eager to
Fig. 1. Tracking vs. comprehensive grade (simulation). Notes: The figures presents a simulation of the effect of attending a low track (L), comprehensive track (C) or
a high track (H), on an arbitrary outcome variable Y, across the ability ranking. The simulation is conducted for 1,000,000 observations. The chosen parameters for αT
are 200, 150 and 0; the chosen parameters for βT are 1, 3 and 5. The effect of early tracking is zero at θa and θb. θc is the cut-off ability type for attending the higher
track. The right figure adds noise in the ability signal to the simulation. The noise is assumed to be normally distributed.
Fig. 2. Simulated effect of early tracking across θi. Notes: The figure shows the simulated effect of early tracking, i.e. the difference in payoff from early vs. late
tracking, incorporating curriculum, noise and peer effects (situation depicted in panel (a) of Figure A1).
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push for track H when uncertainty is high. Assuming that more noise
would also increase the probability of setting a “suboptimal” threshold,
this would be an additional argument against early tracking.
3. Dutch education
3.1. Educational system
This study analyses the effect of the tracking age within the context
of Dutch education. A schematic overview of the Dutch educational
system is provided in Fig. 3. Students in the Netherlands attend six
years of primary school. In secondary education, they can be subse-
quently sorted into four tracks. These are lbo (lower vocational), mavo
(higher vocational), havo (higher general) and vwo (pre-university). We
label these tracks as T1, T2, T3 and T4, respectively, for the remainder
of this paper.6 After being tracked, students can still drop to lower
tracks when their achievement is low. Moving to higher tracks is gen-
erally only possible when the current track has been completed.
After completing secondary school, students can enrol in three types
of post-secondary education. The lowest level is mbo, providing post-
secondary vocational education. Students of both T1 and T2 are eligible
for mbo. Higher education can be divided into two categories; hbo
(higher professional education) and university. Students with a diploma
from the T3 track or higher can enter hbo, while only those with a T4
diploma can (directly) enter university. Students can also reach higher
levels of post-secondary education through “horizontal” pathways: they
are eligible for hbo after completing the highest level of mbo, and for
university after completing hbo. As such, T3 students can still ultimately
complete university, but these alternative routes require more effective
years of education.
3.2. Assignment to tracks
A particular feature of Dutch education is that the assignment of
students to tracks can happen at different stages. Initial sorting of
students upon entry of secondary education (grade 7) is based on two
instruments. One is the standardized high-stakes exit test taken at the
end of primary education (grade 6), the so-called CITO test. The ob-
tained score on the test is tied to a recommendation for a secondary
school track. Additionally, the 6th grade teacher provides a track re-
commendation for each student. This recommendation is provided after
the test score is known, and correlates highly (around 0.85) with the
recommendation from the test. Students can receive “mixed” re-
commendations (e.g. T3/T4) when considered to be at the margin of the
required level for a certain track. It is possible for students and parents
to not comply with the track recommendation, if the secondary school
allows this. It is common practice for secondary schools to set a certain
minimum CITO-score and/or a minimum teacher recommendation as
an entrance requirement.7 Appendix Figure A3 shows the allocation to
tracks by teacher recommendation. Students are more often (initially)
sorted to a track above their recommendation than to a track below
their recommendation. This is most prominent for students with T3 or
T3/T4 recommendations.
While tracking can occur from the start of secondary education, it
can also be postponed to grade 8 or grade 9. This occurs through the
existence of comprehensive “bridge classes”, where students of two or
more tracks are still kept together. This is most common for students in
the highest two tracks. In our sample, 90% of T3 and T4 students is in a
comprehensive grade for at least one year, and 35% for 2 years. For T1
and T2, 70% of students are already tracked in grade 7. Bridge classes
can have different mixtures of (prospective) tracks, with T3/T4 being
the most prevalent combination.8
Later tracking follows a similar approach as tracking at the point of
secondary school entry: schools set a minimum threshold, often based
on average grades, but there still exists a grey area in which students’
and parents’ preferences can be decisive. Both the length of the bridge
class and the achievement threshold are up to the discretion of each
individual school (federal policy only prescribes that students need to
be tracked at the start of grade 10). The use of bridge classes induces
variation in the age at which students are being tracked. Students who
do not attend a bridge class are tracked at age 12 (grade 7), students
who attend a one-year bridge class are tracked at age 13 (grade 8) and
students who attend a two-year bridge class are tracked at age 14
(grade 9). It is this variation in tracking age that we exploit in the
empirical analysis.
Because bridge classes predominantly occur for T3 and T4, our
empirical analysis focuses on these two tracks. T4 is typically labelled
as the classical “academic” track and T3 as the “intermediate” track, but
they both provide theoretical education and are both non-vocational.9
The formal curricula for these tracks, which specify the set of subjects
schools need to teach and the educational goals students should master
at the end of each year, are the same in grades 7 through 9 (“junior
high”). However, schools are free to differentiate subject matters and,
since students in T4 are of higher ability, the material in this track is
typically more advanced (comprising the “instruction effect” specified
in Section 2). In senior high school (grades 10 and above), students still
follow the same subjects in each track but exact subject matter differs
more strongly. This is mainly because T4 lasts until grade 12 while T3
lasts until grade 11. As all students are tracked when in senior high, the
early tracking effect involves differences in instructional difficulty, but
Fig. 3. Dutch educational system. Notes: Source: Center of International
Education Benchmarking.
6 Since 1999, the lowest two tracks are merged into the vmbo track, but the
cohorts we analyse are from before this transition.
7 Korthals (2012) reports that around 88% of students in the Netherlands
attend secondary schools that always consider entrance requirements, which is
among the highest rates worldwide. Dutch schools are lawfully obliged to
consider at least one of the two instruments when allowing and sorting stu-
dents, but are free to determine their exact assignment rule.
8 Of all T3 and T4 students that are not tracked in grade 7, 59% is in a T3/T4
class, 34% in a T2/T3/T4 class, 5% in a T2/T3 class and 2% in a T1/T2/T3/T4
class. For grade 8, these numbers are 81%, 13%, 5% and 2%, respectively.
9 The T3 track is therefore more theoretical than the German intermediate
realschule.
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no difference in formal curricula. This is in contrast to most literature in
this area, in which the different treatment conditions typically involve
different degrees of academic versus vocational education.
4. Data
This study relies on several data sources. First, we use data from the
Dutch Secondary Education Cohort Studies (VOCL), conducted by
Statistics Netherlands and the Groningen Institute for Educational
Research (Driessen & Van der Werf, 1991; Statistics Netherlands, 1991).
These are longitudinal surveys of Dutch students that are followed
across secondary education. We use data from the 1989 and 1993 co-
horts of VOCL. The name of the cohort refers to the year the students
entered secondary education (grade 7). VOCL registers the track re-
commendation that students received at the end of 6th grade, and takes
baseline tests at the start of grade 7. The track recommendation data are
the basis of the subgroup analysis by ability that is a central part of the
empirical analysis. For the remainder of this paper, we refer to students
with T3, T3/T4 and T4 recommendation as students of respectively low,
medium and high ability.10
VOCL further records the track that students attend each year, in-
cluding any combination of mixed tracks in junior high. Additional
background information is collected from student and parental ques-
tionnaires. VOCL also contains test scores from grade 9, for math and
language. There are concerns about the reliability of these 9th grade
test scores, and we therefore report results for these outcomes in
Appendix E and focus on educational attainment and labour market
outcomes in the main paper.
These data are matched with administrative information from the
System of Social Statistical Datasets (SSD) on educational attainment
and labour market outcomes. SSD contains information on attendance
and completion of any post-secondary study program. Registered edu-
cational attainment data are available until 2008, when the 1989 co-
hort is 31 and the 1993 cohort is 27 years old. The share of (T3 and T4)
students still in education in 2008 equals 3.1% for the 1989 cohort and
9.3% for the 1993 cohort. Labour market information was made
available for the period 2001–2007, implying that wages can be ob-
served from the early 20s until age 30 (the 1989 sample in 2007).
Earnings are registered for the month of September in that particular
year. September earnings are seen as most representative, because they
are not affected by end-of-year bonuses or vacation pay. The level of
attrition in the data is very low; 98% of students participating in VOCL
1989 and 99% of students participating in VOCL 1993 are retrieved in
the registered data. Sample sizes per cohort equal 4709 and 5644
(taking only T3 and T4 students).
We further collect data on school tracking policies from the
Educational Inspection Office. These data describe how students are
allocated to tracks for every grade in every school in the Netherlands,
which includes every combination of mixed tracks in junior high (e.g.
T3/T4, T2/T3/T4 etc.). This is measured for the year 1997.11 We de-
duce the relative supply of early tracking schools for every municipality
in the Netherlands, based on all secondary schools (see Section 5.2).
We assess the impact of early tracking across several measures of
educational attainment, to capture the complete dynamic of treatment
effects across the educational career. The main outcomes are: place-
ment into the academic track (T4), completion of T4, completion of
higher education (comprising both professional higher education and
university) and completion of university. We only include the 1989
cohort when estimating labour market effects, as individuals in the
1993 cohort are at most 26 years old in the labour market data. As
many are still in education or at the very start of working life, their
earnings potential is underestimated (results are reported in the ap-
pendix). We focus on earnings data from 2004 to 2007, when students
from the 1989 cohort are 27–30 years old. We take these years since
over 90% of the 1989 cohort has left full-time education by 2004. We
use the administrative gross monthly earnings as a main outcome, as
well as a recoded ‘mean wage’ variable. The latter correct for the full-
time equivalent (FTE) of the main job. As all earnings are measured in
logs, they exclude those with zero earnings (the estimate of early
tracking on the probability of having no earnings is low and statistically
insignificant).
Table 1 reports summary statistics for students in the two highest
tracks, which forms the estimation sample for the empirical analysis.
The two tracks are roughly of similar size and track assignment is stable
between the two cohorts. There are small differences in the background
characteristics of students across cohorts. The 1993 cohort performs
slightly better at baseline tests, has less individuals at either extreme of
the socio-economic background indicators and has fewer students living
in urbanized areas. Early tracking is more common in the 1993 sample
than in the 1989 sample. This difference is due to sampling, since there
are very few changes in tracking policy among schools that appear in
both cohorts. Rates of higher education completion are higher in 1993,
which is part of a general trend, while earnings are naturally lower for
the younger 1993 cohort. Observations are spread across 443 munici-
palities in the Netherlands.
Appendix Figure A4 shows the final educational attainment across
teacher recommendations. The prevalence of higher education com-
pletion is around 60% for students with a T3 recommendation and 80%
for students with a T4 recommendation. Looking at university com-
pletion only, the respective shares are 20% and 60%.12
5. Methodology
5.1. Selection bias
Attending an early tracking school depends on decisions made by
students and parents. Appendix Table B1 shows the mean values of
several background characteristics and outcomes, separately for those
that are tracked early and those that are tracked late. Early tracked
students have more favourable characteristics. This is reflected by sta-
tistically significant differences in baseline test scores, parental educa-
tion and social class.13 This result likely reflects that (parents of) stu-
dents of high ability have stronger preferences to be selected early into
an elite track. Assessing observables across ability groups reveals some
heterogeneity in selection (Appendix Table B2). Low-ability students
are rather balanced across both types of schools while early tracked
students of both medium and high ability are positively selected.
Table B1 also lists outcome variables. Early tracking is associated
with more frequent assignment to the academic track. Interestingly,
early tracked students have lower completion rates of higher education,
even though they have more favourable baseline characteristics.
Assuming that conditional selection on unobservables is of the same
10 From the perspective of the total student population, students with T3
recommendation are at or above the median of the ability distribution, but the
terminology is used here to make the relative distinction with those with T3/T4
recommendations and T4 recommendation.
11 The data for the instrument being from a different year naturally involves a
loss in first stage power, but is otherwise not a threat to instrument validity
(students in schools that switch policy are non-compliers). Moreover, tracking
policies by school are very consistent over time; of the 86 schools that appear in
both the 1989 and 1993 cohort, only 5 changed their tracking policy.
12 The share of students with a higher education degree is around 34% for the
full sample (all tracks). Population data show that the share of students aged
25–34 with a higher educational degree in 2007 is also 34% (Ministerie van
Onderwijs Cultuur en Wetenschap, 2011). Hence, the overall sample appears
representative of the total Dutch population in this age group.
13 Interestingly, the difference is opposite for the intelligence test. The pre-
dictive value of this test towards later outcomes is, however, markedly lower
than that of the other test scores.
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sign as selection on observables, the unbiased ATE is expected to be
even more negative. The difference between early tracked students and
late tracked students is of opposite sign for university completion, while
there are no statistically significant differences for labour market out-
comes. The sign of the difference in earnings outcomes is in favour of
the later tracked students which again is suggestive of a negative ATE
for early tracking.
5.2. Instrument construction
Given the established selection issues, an alternative to OLS is
needed to obtain unbiased estimates. We employ an Instrumental
Variable (IV) approach. Our instrument exploits variation in the share
of early tracking schools across municipalities. This share represents the
local supply of early tracking and as such the choice set of each student.
It is expected to be a strong positive predictor of the actual age at
tracking. At the same time, we assume that it does not correlate with
other determinants of future outcomes. In other words, it is assumed
that the choice for an early or a late tracking school within the local
choice set is selective, but the choice set itself is not.
Using the aforementioned national school-level data, we construct
instrument Zi as the student-weighted share of early tracking schools in
the municipality. This involves two steps: (i) We categorize each school
as either an early or a late tracking school, depending on whether they
separate T3 and T4 students in grade 8 or not (ii) per municipality, we
divide the number of 9th grade T3 and T4 students in ET schools by the
total number of 9th grade T3 and T4 students (as everyone is tracked in
grade 9).
There are two issues in the construction of this instrument. One,
some schools track some students early and others late. This applies to
13 out of the 204 schools in the estimation sample (comprising 11.7%
of the sample). We choose to categorize these schools as early tracking
(i.e. the condition for being an early tracking school is to have at least
one class in which T3 students are separated from T4 students). As the
majority of students in these 13 schools are tracked in grade 8 and 70%
of those that are tracked later are sorted to T3, the earlier tracking
moment appears more decisive in these schools.14 A second issue is that
some students do not have a school that offers T3 or T4 in their mu-
nicipality (around 30% of the sample). In this case, we take the relative
supply of the municipality that most students in these municipalities
commute to, implicitly assuming that this is their effective choice set.
Section 7.1 assesses sensitivity to how students in schools with mixed
policies and students in municipalities without a T3/T4 school are dealt
with.
Fig. 4 shows the distribution of the instrument. For 47% of the
sample, it takes either value 0 (no school in the municipality of re-
sidence tracks early) or 1 (all schools in the municipality of residence
track early). The remaining 53% has both policies in effect in their
municipality. Figure A6 in the appendix shows the number of schools
(having T3/T4 students) per municipality. It shows that 77% of stu-
dents attend a school in a municipality where they can choose between
at least two schools that offer T3 and/or T4.
5.3. The IV model
Using the defined instrument Zi, we specify the following two-stage
model to estimate the effect of Early Tracking (ETi) on outcome Yi:
= + + +ET Z Xi i i i0 1 2
= + + +Y ET X^i i i i0 1 2 (6)
Yi can represent educational and labour market outcomes. Xi is a
vector of controls and ϵi represents a classical error term. As individual-
level controls, we include: month and year of birth, gender, ethnic
origin, social class (6 categories), parental education (three categories),
and baseline scores for an IQ test and for three test domains (language,
math and study skills) of an achievement test. These tests are taken




Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Track 3 (havo) 0.471 0.499 0.472 0.499
Track 4 (vwo) 0.529 0.499 0.528 0.499
Language test 0.731 0.678 0.769 0.647
Math test 0.763 0.696 0.774 0.663
Study skills test 0.712 0.722 0.770 0.686
Intelligence test 0.311 0.840 0.389 0.828
Female 0.509 0.500 0.523 0.499
Urbanisation 3.66 1.28 2.87 1.26
Non-Dutch 0.111 0.315 0.133 0.339
Lowest social class 0.145 0.353 0.131 0.337
Highest social class 0.280 0.449 0.251 0.433
Parent high educ. 0.410 0.492 0.381 0.486
Parent low educ. 0.055 0.228 0.035 0.184
Early Tracking 0.512 0.500 0.653 0.476
Higher education 0.674 0.469 0.719 0.450
University 0.324 0.468 0.325 0.468
Earnings 2007 2979.69 1392.73 2237.30 991.01
Earnings 2006 2748.76 1287.63 1910.49 978.89
Earnings 2005 2419.56 1035.35 1523.20 858.19
Earnings 2004 2239.32 880.24 1281.28 801.84
Wage 2007 3335.57 1332.30 2634.47 935.02
Full-time equivalent 2007 0.887 0.194 0.841 0.245
N 4709 5644
Notes: The table shows means and standard deviations of all main variables, by
cohort. Social class is based on the occupational status of the parents. Degree of
urbanisation is measured in five categories. Higher education jointly comprises
higher professional education (hbo) and university education. Earnings are per
month, gross and in euro’s. ‘Wage’ corrects the earnings measure for the full-
time equivalent of the main job.
Fig. 4. Distribution of early tracking instrument. Notes: The figure shows the
distribution of the instrumental variable Zi. The instrument represents the re-
lative supply of schools that track early (in grade 7 or 8) in the municipality
where the student resides.
14 We choose a dichotomous classification of schools (rather than using shares
for schools with mixed policies) because we want to focus on whether the policy
is offered or not. Additionally, the school-level data are for one particular year
and therefore do not allow us to follow a cohort of students over time. As such,
we do not know the exact share of students within a cohort that is tracked early
and therefore classify each school as a whole. We take an alternative approach
with (approximate) shares in the robustness analysis.
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pre-treatment. We employ robust standard errors, which are clustered
at the level of the municipality. As we estimate the effect of ET between
the top two tracks in Dutch education, we also restrict the sample to
students that are (initially) sorted to either T3 or T4.15 We also estimate
effects by ability subgroup, depending on their 6th grade track re-
commendation.
5.4. Instrument validity
A valid instrument is both relevant and exogenous. We first assess
instrument relevance. The first stage coefficients for Zi are portrayed in
the first row of Tables 3 and 4, for the total sample and subgroups
respectively. The final rows provide the Kleibergen–Paap test statistics.
As we only use the 1989 cohort for the labour market outcomes, first
stage power is lower there. For the T4 subgroup in the 1989 cohort, it is
just above the conventional critical value of 10 (Staiger & Stock, 1997)
but below the Stock–Yogo threshold of 16.38 (Stock & Yogo, 2005).
Earnings estimates for this subgroup are therefore less precise. The
instrumentation for the T3 and T3/T4 recommendation subgroups is
strong.16
Zi relies on cross-sectional variation within the Netherlands, driven
by school-specific policies. This induces potential identification threats.
Before we discuss these, the broader question is where the variation in
ET policy comes from. The decision when to track students is fully up to
school leadership, who operate independently from national and local
governments in the Netherlands. Korpershoek et al. (2016) execute a
case study among 97 secondary schools in the Netherlands to in-
vestigate the motivations for their tracking policy. Schools report that
their own pedagogical and didactic beliefs are the main driver of this
decision. Capacity constraints and parental preferences are presented as
far less important determinants. We interpret this as an indication that
variation in tracking age is not predominantly driven by demand-side
variables, but rather by what each school leader beliefs is the better
choice for the learning process of students.
Given the approach, there are several potential identification
threats in this empirical approach. These fall into four main categories:
(1) Selective commuting of students to schools, (2) parents selecting
their place of residence based on the tracking policy of nearby schools,
(3) schools adjusting tracking policies to the preferences of parents and
students in their area, and (4) tracking policies of schools being cor-
related with other important aspects of school policy and school
quality.
The first identification threat is largely addressed by relying on the
supply of ET schools in the municipality of residence, rather than the
municipality of the school. Still, the imputation of the instrument for
students that live in a municipality without any secondary school can
be partially driven by selective commuting. Section 7.1 addresses the
sensitivity of the results to how we deal with this particular group of
students.
Identification threats (2) and (3) are inherently similar; they con-
cern the assumption that students and parents living in areas with high
Zi have the same baseline characteristics as students and parents living
in areas with low Zi. This cannot be formally tested, but several argu-
ments validate this assumption in the context of our study. First of all,
this is partly mitigated by the institutional setting. In Dutch education,
there are no catchment areas that only allow students that live nearby
to attend, as is common in e.g. the United States. Parents and students
are free to select the primary or secondary school of their choice
(provided they pass eligibility thresholds for achievement, in the case of
secondary schools). Moreover, as the barriers to start a new school are
low and population density is high, there are typically multiple schools
available within a reasonable travel distance (see Appendix Figure A5).
This lowers the incentive of parents to select their residence based on
characteristics of the nearest school. This is corroborated by recent
research. Borghans, Langen, Meshcheriakova, and
Palacios Temprano (2017) find that the housing premium from living
close to a high quality primary school is about ten times smaller in the
Netherlands compared to countries in which catchment areas are in
effect, while Borghans, Golsteyn, and Zölitz (2015) identify a very weak
relation between primary school quality and a range of neighbourhood
characteristics. Additionally, the variation in tracking age is pre-
dominantly between the second year (grade 8) and the third year (grade
9) of secondary education. Hence, schools typically provides both
tracks, and late tracking schools are not compared to strictly categorical
schools.17 Their tracking policy is therefore less salient and less likely to
be taken into account when parents choose a region of residence.
Schools may still adjust tracking policies towards characteristics of
the students and parents in their area. The data contain a wide range of
background characteristics, as well as baseline tests taken at the be-
ginning of secondary school. We run a regression of the instrument on
this set of controls, for the sample as a whole and for the ability sub-
groups. Results are reported in Table 2. They show no evidence of a
relation between Zi and observable characteristics.18 A related issue is
that Zi may affect how primary school teachers give track re-
commendations, which would imply that the specified ability sub-
groups are not comparable across municipalities. Table 2 shows that
there is also no relation between Zi and the 6th grade track re-
commendation. The robustness analysis will assess instrument validity
towards additional parental indicators.
While the instrument does not correlate with any observed in-
dividual characteristic, we identify a small but statistically significant
correlation with the degree of urbanisation of the area.19 Relatedly, Zi
differs across provinces of residence. Geographical indicators can have
an independent effect on the outcomes, for example through differences
in the availability of higher educational institutions or local labour
market conditions. Some evidence against the latter issue is already
provided by the fact that Zi does not correlate with any of the social
status dummies (which are based on parental occupation). Nonetheless,
to assess whether the estimates of ET operate through urbanisation, we
additionally control for urbanization dummies (five categories) and
province of residence (twelve provinces exist).
Finally, schools with different tracking policies might differ in other
characteristics. In particular, the different pedagogical beliefs that are
behind the tracking policy choice can be reflected in other policies. We
analyse the relation between the instrument and a range of school
characteristics, relying on questionnaire data from VOCL and admin-
istrative data. The results of a regression of the instrument on these
characteristics are reported in Appendix Table C1. We do not identify
statistically significant correlations between Zi and school denomina-
tion, student-reported school quality, degree of ability-grouping within
15 A potential concern with limiting the sample is that ET can also affect the
probability of being at least in T3. We find that there is no relation between the
instrument and the probability of attending T3 or higher. The share of students
that ends up in tracks below T3 is also very limited for the recommendation
subgroups we focus on in the heterogeneity analysis (see Appendix Figure A3).
16 Some students in the top two tracks have a track recommendation below T3
(2049 observations), but the first stage power is consistently too low for this
subgroup. Additionally the track recommendation is missing for 402 students.
As such, the sample sizes for the three portrayed subgroups do not add up to
that for the total sample. Appendix Table G1 reports results when including
recommendations below T3 in the low-ability subgroup.
17 Around 9% of schools are categorical, representing around 5% of the stu-
dent population; we assess to what extent this group drives results in
Section 7.1.
18 This is in contrast with other studies that use an IV approach to estimate
(early) tracking effects; e.g. the instrument from both Van Elk et al. (2011) and
Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2005) correlates with baseline test scores.
19 The correlation equals 0.035. It is not strictly linear across the five urba-
nization categories, which is why we include dummy variables.
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class, quality and quantity of school counselling, frequency of group
work, heterogeneity in teaching styles, or use of low-stakes versus high-
stakes testing. There is a statistically significant correlation with school
size. Schools that track early have a total student population that is 15%
larger than that of schools that track late. There is no correlation with
class size. It appears unlikely that school size has a large independent
effect on outcomes that biases our estimates. Including school size as an
additional control has no impact on the estimated coefficients, as it has
no explanatory power towards any of our outcomes.
6. Results
We estimate the effect of Early Tracking (ET) on educational and
labour market outcomes. Estimates using OLS are portrayed in
Appendix Table B3, for comparative purposes. We expect these to be
positively biased given the results from Table B1. OLS and IV estimates
are not fully comparable since the former are ATE and the latter are
LATE, but the OLS estimates are still informative as they likely re-
present upper bounds of the ATE. OLS results indicate a negative re-
lationship between ET and completion of higher education, which is
concentrated in the lower recommendation subgroups. The estimated
relation between ET and university completion is positive for the sub-
groups with the highest track recommendation. For earnings, we ob-
serve negative coefficients for low-ability and, especially, medium-
ability students, but a strong positive estimate for high-ability students.
We now discuss results for the main IV model, separately for the
sample as a whole and for the ability subgroups.
6.1. Full sample
The IV estimates of the effect of ET for the full sample can be ob-
served in Table 3. The table presents three different models; one
without control variables, one adding individual-level controls and one
further adding geographical controls (urbanization and province dum-
mies). The results are highly consistent across the three models, for all
outcomes. The consistency between model I and II confirm results from
the previous section that the instrument is not related to individual
background characteristics. As discussed before, the instrument corre-
lates with urbanization and provincial dummies, which also implies a
slight reduction in first stage power in model III. However, the results
indicate that the estimates do not operate through this channel.
Table 3 shows that ET increases the probability of being selected in
the highest track, by around 12 percentage points (p.p.). Relative to an
average incidence of T4 assignment of 53%, this is a sizable effect.
However, it does not increase the probability of ultimately completing
T4. Hence, many early tracked students fall back to T3 after initial
assignment to T4. This is confirmed by Appendix Table E2, which gives
a more detailed overview of educational attainment results. Moreover,
Table 2
Instrument validity: Correlation with observable characteristics.
Full sample LA MA HA
Age (in years) 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.004*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age (in months) -0.013 -0.032 0.000 -0.010
(0.009) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016)
Female -0.001 -0.007 0.002 -0.023
(0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Non-Dutch 0.006 -0.008 0.038* 0.021
(0.012) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Parent high education 0.005 0.002 0.0090 0.000
(0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Parent low education 0.030 0.049 0.0068 -0.043
(0.020) (0.030) (0.038) (0.045)
Social class cat. II 0.024 0.013 0.028 -0.010
(0.017) (0.022) (0.029) (0.042)
Social class cat. III -0.013 -0.021 0.026 0.002
(0.017) (0.025) (0.026) (0.034)
Social class cat. IV 0.003 0.007 0.019 0.026
(0.015) (0.023) (0.024) (0.031)
Social class cat. V 0.009 -0.033 0.030 0.004
(0.015) (0.022) (0.025) (0.036)
Social class cat. VI 0.011 -0.005 0.027 -0.043
(0.014) (0.023) (0.031) (0.039)
Intelligence test score -0.011 -0.002 -0.008 0.012
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
Language subscore 0.005 -0.002 0.000 0.017
(0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Math subscore 0.004 0.001 0.008 -0.007
(0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017)
Study skills subscore -0.015* -0.022 -0.017 -0.020
(0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.018)
Track rec. MA 0.018 - - -
(0.024)
Track rec. HA 0.029 - - -
(0.037)
Joint significance 0.438 0.434 0.331 0.252
Joint significance with geo 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: *Significant at 10% level **Significant at 5% level ***Significant at 1%
level The table shows results of a regression of the instrument Zi on the referred
list of control variables. Separate regressions are run for the sample as a whole
and for each track recommendation subgroup. ‘Joint significance’ gives the p-
value of a joint significance test on all individual controls, and separately on all
reported variables plus urbanisation and province dummies (‘geo’). For social
class, I = blue collar, II = self-employed, III = low skilled, IV = medium-
skilled, V = high-skilled, VI = not employed. Standard errors are between
parentheses and are robust and corrected for clustering at the municipal level.
Table 3
Long-run effects of early tracking: main analysis (IV model).
I II III I II III
First stage 0.475*** 0.477*** 0.491*** First stage 0.563*** 0.573*** 0.579***
(0.060) (0.059) (0.062) (0.095) (0.093) (0.114)
T4 assignment 0.138*** 0.118** 0.115*** Mean earnings -0.128*** -0.123*** -0.127***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.043) (0.041) (0.039) (0.047)
T4 diploma 0.025 0.016 0.002 Mean wage -0.033 -0.029 -0.027
(0.041) (0.035) (0.035) (0.025) (0.023) (0.028)
High education -0.089*** -0.085*** -0.105*** 2007 earnings -0.131*** -0.136*** -0.136***
(0.029) (0.024) (0.027) (0.039) (0.034) (0.044)
University 0.038 0.032 0.019 2007 FTE -0.043*** -0.048*** -0.048***
(0.036) (0.032) (0.029) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017)
KP stat 119.15 120.76 102.73 75.44 83.54 51.91
Ind. controls yes yes yes yes
Geo. controls yes yes
Notes: *Significant at 10% level **Significant at 5% level ***Significant at 1% level ‘First stage’ estimates are for Zi. Labour market effects are estimated for the 1989
cohort only. ‘High education’ jointly comprises higher professional education and university. See Table 2 for the list of controls. Standard errors, between par-
entheses, are robust and corrected for clustering at the municipal level.
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ET leads to the attainment of fewer higher education diplomas, by
around 10 p.p. (compared to an average incidence of 70%). The esti-
mate for university completion is positive but statistically insignif-
icant.20
The right side of Table 3 presents results for the effect of ET on
labour market outcomes. These are estimated for the 1989 cohort
only.21 ET reduces the average monthly earnings between age 27 and
age 30 by around 14%. Subsequent rows show that the effect of ET on
the mean wage is near zero, while ET significantly reduces the FTE of
the job (by around 0.05, relative to a mean of 0.86). Hence, earnings
effects occur because, given employment, early tracked students work
fewer hours. The results indicate that labour market effects mainly
operate at the lower margin, especially given that average full-time
equivalents are high in this sample. Similarly, we identify no effects
when we exclude the lowest quantile of earnings (not shown).
6.2. Heterogeneity by ability
Table 4 reports estimates of the effect of ET for the three ability
subgroups separately. This reveals a different dynamic in the results for
low-ability students versus medium-ability students. The low-ability
subgroup experiences no increase in T4 assignment, but a substantially
higher probability of retracking to T3 after initial assignment to T4 (see
Appendix Table E2). These results are suggestive of “inefficient”
sorting. ET sends a substantial amount of students to T4 for which the
track is too demanding, as suggested by the increase in retracking to T3.
At the same time, there likely exists a separate group of T3 students that
would have attended and completed T4 under later tracking.22 Since it
is much more common in Dutch secondary education to downgrade
students to a lower track than to promote them to a higher track, the
result is a relative increase in T3 diplomas at the expense of T4 di-
plomas (12 p.p.), which also translates into less frequent enrolment in
higher education (14 p.p.).
Medium-ability students experience a strong increase in T4 assign-
ment when tracked early (14 p.p.), but no significant increase in T4
diplomas (although the point estimate of 6 p.p. is positive and non-
negligible). They subsequently experience a significant decrease in the
share of higher education degrees of 10 p.p., while there is no effect on
higher education enrolment. For these students, it appears that ET leads
to overambitious sorting into T4, which in subsequent years leads to
frequent downgrading to T3, and lower persistence in higher education
studies.
For both the low-ability and the medium-ability students, ET also
translates into lower earnings in early adulthood. The point estimates
are stronger for the medium-ability group (19%) compared to the low-
ability group (15%). The former also experience a negative impact on
their wage, of around 10%. Hence, not all of the effect for this group
operates through hours worked. The earnings effect for the medium-
ability subgroup continues a pattern of deteriorating effects across age,
as the point estimates for this group are positive but insignificant for T4
completion, negative but relatively small for higher education com-
pletion and strongly negative for earnings.
The estimates for the highest ability students are consistently posi-
tive though have low precision. Similar to the medium-ability sub-
group, ET increases the probability of attending T4, by around 18 p.p.
This also translates into an increase in T4 diplomas, by 15 p.p. High-
ability students do not obtain more higher education diplomas from ET,
but do substitute higher professional education (hbo) diplomas for
university diplomas. The latter increase by a substantial 18 p.p. (the
average incidence for this subgroup is 57%). Earnings estimates are
positive but statistically insignificant for high-ability students. The
point estimates are high, ranging between 8% and 11%, but suffer from
high imprecision due to low first stage power. Hence, we cannot draw
any definite conclusions for the earnings effects of ET for high-ability
students, but the estimates are suggestive of a positive effect. Hence, in
addition to inducing a (local) average negative effect, ET also leads to
an increase in the inequality of educational attainment and earnings
across ability.
6.2.1. Additional outcomes
We further analyze additional outcome variables that may act as
mechanisms toward the long-run effects identified before. First of all,
we analyse whether ET affects achievement in grade 9. To deal with
limitations of the achievement data, we employ several sensitivity
analyses. A more elaborate explanation is provided in Appendix E, as
are the results. In short, we do not find any strong evidence that ET
affects achievement, or acts as a mechanism for long-run effects within
any of the ability subgroups.
Secondly, we look at study field choice. Earnings effects of ET are
Table 4
Long-run effects of early tracking by ability: Subgroup analysis (IV model).
LA MA HA LA MA HA
First stage 0.545*** 0.504*** 0.435*** First stage 0.616*** 0.671*** 0.390***
(0.070) (0.077) (0.078) (0.103) (0.103) (0.116)
T4 assignment 0.014 0.140*** 0.176*** Mean earnings -0.145** -0.192*** 0.086
(0.061) (0.053) (0.059) (0.060) (0.057) (0.146)
T4 diploma -0.123*** 0.058 0.147** Mean wage -0.023 -0.098*** 0.084
(0.047) (0.063) (0.071) (0.036) (0.037) (0.096)
High education -0.136*** -0.102** 0.053 2007 Earnings -0.130** -0.237*** 0.106
(0.044) (0.042) (0.062) (0.060) (0.059) (0.166)
University -0.030 -0.034 0.175** 2007 FTE -0.041 -0.076*** 0.064
(0.038) (0.054) (0.076) (0.025) (0.021) (0.055)
KP stat 90.45 61.00 39.20 76.85 82.78 14.14
N 2954 3004 1944 1420 1404 915
Notes: *Significant at 10% level **Significant at 5% level ***Significant at 1% level Estimates are shown for those of low ability (T3 recommendation; LA), medium
ability (T3/T4 recommendation; MA) and high ability (T4 recommendation; HA). Standard errors, between parentheses, are robust and corrected for clustering at the
municipal level.
20 Table E2 further shows that the effect of ET on higher education diplomas
is mainly the result of lower enrolment, rather than completion given enrol-
ment. ET also leads to a (marginally significant) increase in retention rates. This
likely relates to the higher probability of misallocation.
21 Appendix Table G2 shows that the educational outcomes for the 1989
cohort are highly similar to those for the full sample. There is a small difference
in the estimates for the full sample but the subgroup estimates are very similar.
The former is mainly driven by the stronger first stage for low-ability students
in 1989, leading to a stronger weight of this subgroup in the overall coefficient.
22 An alternative explanation is that late tracked students are downgraded
less often from T4 to T3 through better learning during the extra year of
comprehensive education. However, estimates appear to be too large to be
attributed to differences in the learning environment that only last one year,
also given that peer effects should work in favour of early tracked students in T4
in that one year.
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large relative to the effects on educational attainment, especially for the
medium-ability subgroup.23 Study choice may be a mediator. We dis-
tinguish eight different study fields; results are portrayed in Table E3 in
the Appendix. The negative effect of ET on higher education completion
for low-ability students mainly comes at the expense of economics de-
grees. For the medium-ability subgroup, the point estimate is largest for
economics as well, and just shy of statistical significance thresholds. For
the high-ability subgroup, math and technical degrees increase, at the
expense of mainly humanities. As shown at the bottom of the table,
average earnings are highest in economics. This is partly because FTE’s
are comparatively high in economics. As such, part of the earnings and
labour supply effect of ET operates via study choice. We have seen that
ET leads to a lower inclination of entering higher education, also when
students are eligible to do so. The results for study choice may indicate
that ET also leads to a lower selection of majors that can be perceived as
more challenging.
6.3. Additional heterogeneity analysis
We have also analysed effect heterogeneity by student background
(gender, parental education and relative age). We do not identify strong
evidence of heterogeneity but estimates are imprecise. Results are re-
ported in Appendix F. There is some indication that negative wage ef-
fects are stronger for (low-ability) women. This likely relates to the
observation that, while boys obtain slightly better CITO scores than
girls, there are substantially more girls in T4 by grade 9. As girls are
more likely to outperform their initial ability assessments, they are
more at risk of being sorted to a “too low” track when tracking is done
early.
Finally, we conduct heterogeneity analysis by endogenous sub-
groups, to further understand the mechanisms behind the long-run ef-
fects. The main results show that ET leads to high initial assignment to
T4 but frequent downgrading to T3 in later grades. It remains unclear
whether the latter completely drives the negative long-run effects (e.g.
through detrimental effects on motivation and ability beliefs). We as-
sess this by estimating effects for subsamples that select on earlier
outcomes. This sample selection naturally leads to biased estimates, but
the direction of the bias can be predicted and lower or upper bounds
can be established as a result. For example, ET has a negative impact on
completing higher education. When we estimate the model only for
those with a higher education degree, ET students are positively se-
lected (as they need to overcome the ‘penalty’ from being tracked
earlier). The results then represent a conservative estimate of the ne-
gative impact of ET on earnings, net of its effect on higher education
completion. Similarly, we can select a subsample of students who ob-
tained a T4 diploma. As there is no (average) effect of ET on T4 di-
plomas for the full sample, the bias from selecting on this outcome is
likely small.
Selecting only students with a T4 diploma reduces the coefficient for
higher education completion substantially, but it remains negative and
just shy of statistical significance (see Appendix Table G3). This sug-
gests that track switches explain a substantial part of the relation be-
tween ET and higher education completion, but does not preclude a
negative impact for those that remain in the academic track. Labour
market effects are smaller but still negative and statistically significant.
When we select only students with a higher education diploma, labour
market results similarly show smaller but still substantially negative
point estimates. This suggests that the effect of ET on earnings operates
through more than just lowering higher education diplomas. Results for
the subgroups are also reported, but they are more difficult to interpret,
as the expected biases have different directions and sizes. Nonetheless,
they confirm the main result that these intermediary outcomes are
mediators but do not explain away the complete effect.
One reason for this result could be that the more lenient track as-
signment under early tracking creates a group of students that become
less motivated to persist in post-secondary education after following the
demanding track T4, also when they complete T4.24 This also relates to
recent findings from Elsner and Isphording (2017) that a student's rank
in class impacts post-secondary education decisions, conditional on
own ability. Such effects could potentially also explain why early
tracked students select into majors with lower expected wages and jobs
with fewer working hours.
6.4. Discussion
Coming back to the theoretical framework in Section 2, the results
confirm the prediction of especially large gains from later tracking for
medium-ability students. This goes against the traditional linear de-
piction of tracking as a loss for the low-achieving and a gain for the
high-achieving. The high negative effect for the medium-ability sub-
group could arise through the high probability of misallocation and
through instruction effects. While we cannot disentangle these, the
strong effects on track switching and the subsequent pattern of results
suggest that misallocation is a strong factor. Scenario (b) from Figures
A1 and A2, in which assignment is noisy and too lenient, mimics the
actual findings most closely.
We find negative effects for low-ability students as well. Negative
impacts of ET are more likely at the bottom of the distribution than at
the top, because peer quality is negatively affected in the former and
positively affected in the latter case.25 Aside from peer effects, the re-
sults for low-ability students also suggest that the ability signal is
especially noisy, leading to misallocation also for students whose per-
ceived ability level is further away from the threshold. That this does
not lead to negative effects for the high-ability group can be because
peer effects operate in the opposite direction there. Moreover, this is a
relatively smaller group at the very top of the ability distribution. Re-
tracking even occurs within this group, further highlighting the ability
signal’s high noise. This is not surprising in light of recent insights from
neuroscience and educational investment analysis, which indicate that
early adolescence is the period in which cognitive skills are most mal-
leable (Hoxby, 2018). As such, a difference in the tracking age of even
one year can lead to very different conclusions about what is a student’s
optimal track. As these track choices in turn determine secondary and
post-secondary career paths, they can potentially have major effects
throughout the life cycle.
We emphasize that although the results suggest that a substantial
share of the negative effects of ET is driven by putting students in too
demanding tracks, one should not interpret this as evidence in favour of
keeping the academic track small. The LATE suggests that placement in
a high track can have negative consequences for students that are se-
lected in a higher track because of early tracking. In other words, these
students would not have been in the higher track if they had attended a
late tracking school (i.e. under a larger information set). This does not
preclude that other students could have benefited from being sent to the
high track. In fact, results suggest that a sizable group of students with a
T3 recommendation would have.
23 When measured in years of schooling (coded to the obtained diploma using
common standards for the Netherlands), the educational attainment effects are
around -0.9 for the low-ability subgroup and -0.5 for the medium-ability sub-
group.
24 Alternatively, this same group of students could effectively learn less in the
academic track because of the instruction effect. While we do not identify
strong achievement effects in grade 9, these might still arise in upper secondary
education.
25 We note that T3 recommendation students are not the very lowest ability
students in the sample, as 15% has a lower recommendation. When including
these students within the low-ability subgroup, point estimates become even
slightly stronger (see Appendix Table G1).
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Additionally, it is somewhat surprising that the decrease in T4 di-
plomas translates into a decrease in diplomas for higher professional
education rather than university education. The eligibility threshold for
university lies between tracks T3 and T4, while both T3 and T4 students
are eligible for higher professional education. However, even though
students that complete T3 are eligible for (part of) higher education,
they enrol to a significantly lower extent than T4 students (68% versus
90% in the full sample and 58% versus 79% for LA). The effect of ET on
higher education for the low-ability subgroup might therefore operate
through conforming to peer behaviour rather than through formal
eligibility.26
7. Robustness
We conduct several robustness checks that centre around the threats
to the validity of the instrument that have been specified in Section 5.4.
7.1. Construction of the instrument
We first assess sensitivity to the exact construction of Zi. Results for
the full sample are reported in Table 5. Robustness results by subgroup
are provided in Appendix D.
The main analysis imputes values for students without a T3 or T4
school in their municipality (around 30% of the sample) by relying on
the municipality that most students commute to. This imputation may
be a threat to instrument validity, as it is based on choices of parents
and students where to commute to, and thus prone to selective mobi-
lity. As a robustness check, we exclude all students for which the in-
strument is thusly imputed. The results for this alternative approach are
highly similar to those of the base model. We also report results from a
model in which we strictly rely on the supply of ET of the municipality
where the school resides. The long-run estimates are slightly less ne-
gative in this case, suggesting that there is some selective mobility of
better students to municipalities with a high supply of ET schools, but
the differences are small in magnitude.
Another potential issue is that Zi is based on student counts. We
choose this approach because the supply of ET places should also reflect
school size. Moreover, using student shares increases variation and
therefore first stage power. However, school size is co-determined by
students’ enrolment decisions. We alternatively construct Zi using the
share of ET schools, not weighted by school size. Table 5 shows that the
pattern of results is very similar. The estimate for T4 assignment is
statistically insignificant in the full sample, but effects for this outcome
are still positive and strongly statistically significant for the medium-
ability and high-ability subgroups, while remaining statistically insig-
nificant (now with negative sign) for the low-ability subgroup. Results
are also similar when we replace the dichotomous classification of ET
schools with (approximated) shares for the 13 schools that have mixed
policies (‘student share’ column).
Additionally, we have generally classified the effect of ET in our
sample as the effect of tracking in grade 8 versus tracking in grade 9,
while around 10% of the sample is tracked in grade 7 already. These
students could be especially important as they are more constrained by
their track recommendation and more at risk of misallocation.
Moreover, one might be more concerned about instrument validity
within this subgroup, as it also contains students that are in categorical
schools. When we exclude those tracked in grade 7 from the estimation,
results are highly similar to those for the full sample (Appendix Table
G4).
7.2. Estimation by degree of urbanization
Analysis has shown that there is a correlation between Zi and the
degree of urbanization, but that the estimated effects do not operate
through this channel. We further assess to what extent the effects of ET
are consistent across rural and urban areas. The nature of the variation
in Zi in each of these areas differs. Rural municipalities typically have
only one school and the instrument will equal either 0 or 1, while urban
municipalities typically offer both options but with variation in the
relative shares between 0 and 1. One might consider the former source
of variation as ‘cleaner’. The single school has to decide one of the two
options and that single decision leads to large variation in Zi. On the
other hand, when there are two municipalities with 5 schools and one
has 4 ET schools and the other has 1 ET school, the threat of systematic
differences between these two municipalities likely is larger. If urban
areas completely drive the results, this would therefore be a concern.
Conversely, when rural areas completely drive the results this could be
problematic given that the lower supply of schools in the area (see
Figure A5) increases the threat of parents choosing their place of re-
sidence based on ET policy.
The final columns of Table 5 portray results separately for munici-
palities with low urbanization (highest two categories) and high urba-
nization (lowest three categories). The cut-off is chosen so that the first
stage power is roughly equal in each case. There are some differences in
exact magnitudes, but we identify the same pattern of results in both
cases. The fact that we obtain the same overall conclusions, relying on
variation in Zi that is of different nature and is differently vulnerable to
the identification threats specified before, provides further evidence in
favour of the validity of our results.
7.3. Parental attitudes and investments
Earlier analysis shows that individual background characteristics
are not correlated with Zi. Parents can still differ in attitudes and be-
liefs. When parental attitudes towards tracking ages influence ET po-
licies of the schools in their area of residence, and when these attitudes
also independently affect long-run outcomes, the estimates will be
biased.
We use data from VOCL parental and student questionnaires to as-
sess whether the instrument correlates with parental attitudes and in-
vestments. Results are provided in Appendix Table C2, for the full
sample and the ability subgroups. The data contain parental involve-
ment measures on homework help, talking about school at home and
providing encouragement to work hard in school, for both the mother
and the father. They further measure attendance of PTA meetings, and
museum and library visits. None of these indicators correlates sig-
nificantly with Zi. We do identify a statistically significant negative
correlation with the size of the parental social network. Given the
number of variables we assess, this could simply be the result of mul-
tiple hypothesis testing. Moreover, the variable does not correlate with
any outcome variable, so it appears unlikely that this drives the pattern
of results. We find no associations with parental gender attitudes
(which are potentially important in light of the labour supply effects for
women), parental educational aspirations, and authoritarian parenting
styles.
7.4. School quality
ET schools may differ in other aspects than just their tracking policy.
We have already shown that Zi does not correlate with a range of school
characteristics, other than school size. A specific issue in light of the
identified results is that schools that keep students of different ability
together for a longer time might be more concerned in general about
inequality and therefore especially invest in improving outcomes of low
achieving students. We therefore assess whether ET affects the variation
in 9th grade test scores but identify no effects. Moreover, if later
26 Several studies show the substantial effect that peers can have on enrol-
ment decisions; see, e.g., Bobonis and Finan (2009) and De Giorgi, Pellizzari,
and Redaelli (2009)
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tracking schools would indeed invest more in low-ability students, one
would also have expected a negative effect of ET on achievement of
low-ability students, and this would also not explain the fact that the
long-run effects are largest for medium-ability students.
Given that ET policies are largely based on pedagogical beliefs of the
principal or school board, we acknowledge that it is unlikely that ET
schools and late tracking schools are completely identical in how they
otherwise teach students. One might therefore claim that we rather
estimate the effect of being in a (self-determined) ET school rather than
the effect of ET per se. Nonetheless, data show that this is not reflected
in a range of key objective measures of school policy and quality.
Moreover, the hypothesis that school quality differences are driving the
results would be inconsistent with the lack of an achievement effect,
and with the heterogeneity in effects across ability.
7.5. Students still in education
Some students have not completed their education yet in the final
year for which the data are available. This applies to 3.1% of those from
the 1989 cohort and 9.3% of the 1993 cohort. Table G5 in the appendix
shows that the estimates are not sensitive to this limitation. Most im-
portantly, the probability of still being in education at this point is not
affected by ET, across cohorts and ability groups.
The scope of the data is also relevant for the interpretation of the
earnings effects, as these are only estimated in young adulthood. Still,
effects for 2007 earnings are very similar to those for average earnings
in 2004–2007. We find that negative wage effects are statistically sig-
nificant from age 27 onwards, and do not increase afterwards (see
Appendix Table E4). This also explains the largely insignificant results
for the 1993 cohort, as these students are 26 years old in 2007. The
signs of the estimates for the 1993 cohort point in the same direction.27
One would preferably estimate earnings effects over the complete
lifetime. Given that ET induces lower average educational attainment,
which typically implies flatter age-earnings profiles (Borjas, 2015), we
may underestimate the negative impact of ET on earnings. Still, the fact
that estimates are rather stable between ages 27 and 30 while average
earnings are strongly increasing for these ages is suggestive evidence
that the effect is constant once people are settled in the labour market.
Moreover, Bhuller, Mogstad, and Salvanes (2011) show that the life-
time earnings impacts of an extra year of schooling are closest ap-
proximated by earnings impacts in the early 30’s. The 2007 earnings
effect may therefore be a reasonable approximation of the average
lifetime earnings effect of ET.
8. Conclusion
This study estimates the impact of the age of tracking on long-run
outcomes, for students in the intermediate and academic track in the
Netherlands. We use the relative supply of early tracking schools at the
municipal level as an instrument for being tracked early (grade 7 or 8
versus grade 9). Results show that early tracking negatively affects the
probability of obtaining a higher education degree (by 10 p.p) as well as
earnings at age 30 (by 14%). Earnings effects are largely driven by
decreases in hours worked, and are larger for women. Negative earn-
ings effects are present for students of both low ability and medium
ability, but are the result of different dynamics. Point estimates of the
effect of early tracking on high-ability students are imprecisely esti-
mated, but strongly suggestive of a positive effect. Hence, early tracking
in the Netherlands negatively affects both efficiency and equality in
long-run outcomes. The pattern of results appears largely driven by
strong misallocation of students to tracks under early tracking, when
the information set on the student is smaller. These effects arise not
only from “late bloomers” who are put in tracks below their potential,
but also from initial assignment to a track that is too demanding. The
results suggest that misallocation (partly mediated by subsequent
downgrading in later years) affects decisions that students make in post-
secondary education and thereafter, in terms of how long they persist in
education, what study field they pursue and how many hours they
work. Higher peer quality (for the low-ability students) and better-
targeted instruction (for the medium-ability students) could further
contribute to the favourable outcomes for later tracking.
Our reliance on (static) within-country variation in tracking ages for
a settled tracking system contrasts our study with those that rely on
policy changes for identification. The downside of the IV approach is
that the validity of an instrument cannot be formally tested. While
different robustness tests consistently provide evidence in favour of
instrument validity, we cannot rule out that unobserved differences in
Table 5
Robustness to alternative specifications.
Base model Exclude no school School municipality School share Student share Low urbaniz. High urbaniz.
T4 assignment 0.115*** 0.139** 0.112*** 0.065 0.113*** 0.171*** 0.087
(0.043) (0.054) (0.039) (0.044) (0.041) (0.054) (0.060)
T4 diploma 0.002 0.029 0.006 -0.029 0.010 0.013 -0.013
(0.035) (0.044) (0.030) (0.035) (0.034) (0.049) (0.046)
High education -0.105*** -0.111*** -0.064** -0.079*** -0.099*** -0.069* -0.131***
(0.027) (0.033) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.036) (0.039)
University 0.019 0.021 0.029 0.013 0.016 0.015 0.0037
(0.029) (0.037) (0.024) (0.029) (0.027) (0.037) (0.038)
Mean earnings -0.127*** -0.117** -0.099*** -0.083* -0.113*** -0.153* -0.103*
(0.047) (0.053) (0.036) (0.049) (0.044) (0.080) (0.054)
Mean wage -0.027 -0.023 -0.011 0.002 -0.024 -0.003 -0.034
(0.028) (0.032) (0.025) (0.030) (0.027) (0.042) (0.033)
2007 earnings -0.136*** -0.110** -0.095*** -0.110** -0.130*** -0.159* -0.120**
(0.044) (0.046) (0.031) (0.046) (0.041) (0.082) (0.053)
2007 FTE -0.048*** -0.040** -0.051*** -0.061*** -0.044*** -0.084*** -0.032
(0.017) (0.019) (0.014) (0.019) (0.016) (0.028) (0.022)
Notes: *Significant at 10% level **Significant at 5% level ***Significant at 1% level The columns report, in order: estimates from the main IV model; estimates when
excluding students without a school in their municipality; estimates when Zi is based on municipality where the school resides; estimates where Zi is based on school
shares rather than student shares; estimates where Zi is based on student shares for schools with mixed policies; estimates on a sample from low urbanized areas;
estimates on a sample from high urbanized areas. All estimations use the full set of controls. Standard errors are between parentheses and are robust and corrected for
clustering at the municipal level.
27 The estimates appear slightly lower for the low-ability subgroup in 1993,
compared to the same ages in 1989. Additional analysis shows that ET increases
the probability of having no earnings in the 1993 cohort (in contrast to the
1989 cohort), which are naturally excluded in the log earnings estimates. We
identify a marginally significant negative effect of ET on age 26 earnings for
low-ability students when including zero-earners (using a level specification).
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parental and student characteristics exist between areas with few and
areas with many early tracking schools, or that early and late tracking
schools differ in other (unobserved) dimensions than their tracking
policy alone. We emphasize, however, that if early tracking policies are
shaped by the preferences of parents and students in the area, then we
would expect the bias to be of the same direction as in the OLS esti-
mation. Correlations show that better achieving students, from more
affluent backgrounds, prefer to attend early tracking schools. If these
preferences are also reflected in the instrument, any potential bias
would be positive in the IV as well, implying even an underestimation
of the negative effect of early tracking. Additionally, any substantial
bias through differences in school policy or quality appears inconsistent
with the specific dynamic and heterogeneity in the identified results.
It is difficult to assess how representative our findings are for other
countries. The negative effects we identify appear partly mediated by
more lenient initial sorting under early tracking (for medium-ability
students) and a lack of upward retracking opportunities (for low-ability
students), which may both be particular of Dutch education. On the
other hand, sorting more students into a higher track under earlier
tracking could be a more general result of higher uncertainty, while
upward retracking is also limited in other countries that track early.
Germany, in contrast, provides more opportunities for upward re-
tracking (Dustmann, Puhani, & Schönberg, 2017). The effects of ET
might be less harmful in that context, especially for students of (initially
perceived) low ability. As previous literature is focused on a different
setting (academic versus vocational education) any definite conclusions
on external validity can only be made after future research for other
countries in a similar setting. Nonetheless, our results further empha-
size that the effect of tracking policy can be different between the short
and the long run, as shown before by Hall (2012) and Malamud and
Pop-Eleches (2010, 2011), while they confirm the negative long-run
effects of earlier tracking for low-ability students, as identified by
Meghir and Palme (2005) and Pekkarinen et al. (2009). They also
confirm the more general finding that (earlier) tracking increases in-
equality, which is not offset by gains in efficiency. In our study, this
increase in inequality arises when looking across baseline ability, but is
also reflected by negative effects that are concentrated at the bottom of
the earnings distribution within these ability groups.
We emphasize that our study strictly looks at tracking for students
in the academic and the intermediate track. While this makes the
analysis complementary to the existing literature that is mainly focused
on academic versus vocational students, these results cannot be extra-
polated towards vocational education. In the context of the theoretical
model, one may expect that both the positive and negative aspects of
early tracking are larger in a setting that sorts to both academic and
vocational education, as the differences in peer ability and curriculum
(and thereby also the cost of misallocation) are bigger as well. On the
other hand, allocation may be less noisy when separating between
vocational and academic education than when sorting between two
non-vocational tracks. Nonetheless, our study shows that even when
there are no differences in (academic vs. vocational) curricular focus
and the difference in the tracking age is only one year, tracking ages can
have substantial effects on students’ educational career paths and la-
bour market success.
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